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As my subtitle suggests, my goal today is to reveal a connection between Descartes’ mathematics and his metaphysics.  The math I’m referring to is the math of Descartes’ 1637 Geometry, a text which played an important, even groundbreaking, role in the development of what we now know as ‘analytic geometry.’  Though it’s clear that mathematicians drew inspiration from Descartes’ blending of geometry and algebra in this text, it’s less clear how we should situate Descartes’ innovative mathematical work in the larger body of his own philosophical corpus.  If, for instance, we look at Descartes’ most well-known works, the Meditations (1641) and the Principles of Philosophy (1644), there’s explicit mention of the demonstrative certainty of mathematics, but so far as I’m aware, there’s no mention of the geometrical construction procedures or the algebraic representation of curves that distinguish Descartes’ mathematical work.
	John Schuster (1980) and Henk Bos (2001) have suggested that connections between Descartes’ innovations in mathematics and his later more mature works are difficult to draw, because on their respective accounts, Descartes abandoned his attempt to reconcile his mathematical methods with his general philosophical program in the late 1620s.  It was during this time that Descartes started to become more comfortable using algebraic techniques to solve geometrical problems.  But difficulties emerged for him as he tried to incorporate these techniques into the general science of human wisdom he proposed in the Rules for the Direction of the Mind, an incomplete philosophical work Descartes had begun composing in 1619.  Bos and Schuster have suggested that it was Descartes’ inability to incorporate his algebraic techniques into his philosophical account of mathematical reasoning that motivated his abandonment of the Rules in 1628, and Bos claims as well that, at this moment of abandonment, we see “the beginning of the gradual separation of the ways of Descartes the mathematician and Descartes the philosopher” (Bos 2001, 270).  Certainly, math continues to play some role in Descartes’ later writings; but I take it that the point being made by Bos is that, in 1628, the peculiar innovations that characterize Descartes’ mathematical work cease to offer him a guide as he builds his mature philosophical program.  
I agree with the general spirit of Bos’ and Schuster’s claims, and building on the work they’ve done, I want to look more carefully at how the story of Descartes the philosopher and Descartes the mathematician proceeds in the years immediately following 1628.  Specifically, I will focus on the 1633 Le Monde and the 1637 Geometry and hope to show that Descartes is still trying in this period to integrate his distinctively Cartesian version of math with his distinctively Cartesian version of philosophy.  Being even more specific (slide), I will look at the creation story presented in Le Monde in conjunction with Descartes’ solution to the Pappus problem, which was published in the Geometry.  On the reading I’ll offer, we find both a mathematical influence on the early metaphysics in Le Monde as well as (and this is the heart of my account) a metaphysical grounding for one very important part of the mathematical program that Descartes presents in the Geometry.  I’m actually going to begin where my story ends and start with a brief discussion of Descartes’ solution to the Pappus problem (slide).  After that, as the main part of my title suggests, there will be a lot of talk about God, both when I discuss the creation story of Le Monde and when I end the paper with some very brief remarks about Descartes’ view of math in the later part of his career.    
II. Descartes’ Solution to the Pappus Problem
In general, the Pappus problem is a locus problem; we start with a given set of conditions and the problem is to find a set (or locus) of points that meet a specified condition.  Before I turn to Descartes’ solution to the general problem, I want to go through a somewhat trivial case of the Pappus problem to help you see what’s at stake.  
Given:		1 line L1, 1 angle θ1 = 90 degrees, line segment a = 1, and ratio β = 2 : 1





Problem:	(slide) Find all points P such that d : a :: β : 1, that is, such that d : 1 :: 2 : 1.  In other words, find all points P such that P creates a 90 degree angle with L1 and is a distance 2 from L1 (slide).
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And together, the locus of points form a line that is parallel to the given line L, which (following Bos) I’ll call the “Pappus curve” (slide).  
						“Pappus Curve”
		     d = 2
L1
In the case above, I gave you one line and one angle.  In the general Pappus problem, we begin with n lines, n angles, a line segment a, and a ratio β (slide).  We define d as the oblique distance between P and Li such that P creates θi with Li, and the goal is to find the locus (or set) of points P such that the following ratios are equal to β (slide):
For 3 lines:		(d1)2 	:	d2d3	
		For 4 lines:		d1d2	:	d3d4 	
		For 5 lines:	          d1d2d3	:	ad4d5	
		For 6 lines	          d1d2d3	:	d4d5d6

	In general,
		For an even 2k number of lines:
					d1…dk		:	dk+1…d2k	
		For an uneven 2k+1 lines:
					d1…dk+1	:	adk+2…d2k+1

As in the 1-line case we just looked at, it is the case that for any n-line Pappus problem, there are an infinite number of points P that satisfy what is required in the problem.   The Pappus curves formed by these sets of points will be more or less complicated depending on the configuration of the given lines and the measures of the given angles. 
Descartes began his study of this problem in 1632, but his solution wasn’t made public until the Geometry was published in 1637.  In the context of the Geometry, his goal is not to only show that he’s found a solution but also show that all Pappus curves are ‘geometric’.  In other words, he wants to establish that the Pappus curves are essentially distinct from ‘imaginary’ non-geometrical curves, such as the spiral, so that these Pappus curves can be included in the rigorous and exact domain of geometry.  Given the criteria he sets out in the Geometry, showing that the Pappus curves are ‘geometric’ requires that he show that these curves are constructible by legitimately clear and distinct continuous motions (cf. G, 43; slide).  However, when Descartes presents his solution, he constructs Pappus curves by means of point-wise construction.  In particular, he reduces the sought after ratio in the general Pappus problem to an equation in two unknowns and then tells us we can find points along the curve by means of substitution; we simply plug in values for one variable and then solve for the corresponding values of the other variable.  Using this method we can locate points along the curve and then connect the dots, so to speak.  While Descartes is right that we can use the sort of point-wise construction he’s describing to generate Pappus curves, this is not the type of construction that we ought to be using for a curve that is legitimately ‘geometric’; as mentioned above, we should instead use a construction by continuous motion.  Descartes, however, doesn’t have a general method for tracing Pappus curves by continuous motion in his arsenal (and as a historical note, no such method was published until the 19th Century).  
In the absence of a general method for tracing Pappus curves, he instead tries to establish the status of Pappus curves as legitimately ‘geometric’ by exploiting the difference between the point-wise construction of Pappus curves and the point-wise construction of ‘imaginary’ non-geometrical curves.  According to Descartes, when we use a point-wise construction to generate an ‘imaginary’ curve (such as a spiral), we cannot find arbitrary points along the curve (G, 88-91).  (I can give you an example during Q&A; for now, I’m skipping the details for the sake of time.)  However, we can locate arbitrary points on the curve when we point-wise construct a Pappus curve; borrowing Bos’ terminology, Descartes is claiming that Pappus curves can be generated by ‘generic’ point-wise constructions.  Based on this difference in their point-wise constructions, Descartes makes a further and very contentious assertion (slide): “…this method of tracing a curve by determining a number of its points taken at random applies only to curves that can be generated by a regular and continuous motion…”(G, 91).  So what Descartes assumes without argument is that if we can find arbitrary points along a curve using a point-wise construction, then we could also trace the curve by continuous motion.  
To make the problem here clearer, I’ve summarized his argument for the ‘geometric’ status of Pappus curves as follows (slide):
	1. For any n-line Pappus problem, we can reduce the problem to an equation.
2. Using the equation, we can arbitrarily determine points on the Pappus curve by substituting values for the unknown variables into the equation.
* 3. If we can arbitrarily determine points on the Pappus curve by substituting values into the equation, then the curve could also be constructed by continuous motions.
4. If the curve can be constructed by continuous motions, then it is a ‘geometric’ curve.
	Therefore, any Pappus curve is a legitimately ‘geometric’ curve.
It is, of course, claim 3 that is problematic.  Descartes asserts this equivalence between generic point-wise constructions and constructions by continuous motions without proof, and even without much argument.  
	This tension in Descartes’ presentation of the Pappus problem was the focus of Bos’ tremendously important article of 1981.  Later, in her 1991 book, Emily Grosholz would claim that Descartes is forced to make his contentious equivalence between generic point-wise construction and construction by continuous motions, because of the reductionist and intuitionist approach he takes in the Geometry.  As she has it, Descartes’ attempt to reduce the foundations of geometry to intuitively clear simple motions and simple objects prevents adequate treatment of more complicated curves, and this is precisely what Descartes’ approach to the Pappus curves reveals.
	Though I agree with Grosholz that there is no argument for the equivalence of generic point-wise constructions and constructions by continuous motions that meets Descartes’ own rationalist standards of demonstration, I’m less confident about her suggestion that, in the Geometry, Descartes makes the controversial move he does without any grounds at all and just so that he can maintain his rationalist program of geometry.  As an alternative, I want to suggest that, at the time he was writing the Geometry, Descartes did have some grounds on which to base his contentious equivalency.  To make my case, I turn our attention to what may seem an unlikely source, the metaphysical treatise Le Monde, which offers some indication of why Descartes may have taken the equivalency to be humanly intelligible and therefore acceptable, even without a mathematical proof at hand.


III. God’s Creation in Le Monde
Le Monde was written between October 1629 and 1633, and includes two major sections:  Treatise on Light and Treatise on Man.  In the Treatise on Light, Descartes offers his account of a “new world” that is intended to serve as a more convincing and intelligible model than that offered by the Scholastics.  Descartes is attempting to replace their “old” earth-centered world of forms and qualities with a new sun-centered world of matter in motion.  [As a historical note, Descartes suppressed Le Monde in its entirety in November 1633 after he heard about Galileo’s condemnation, which occurred in June of that same year.]  
	In presenting his new world, Descartes does not make a direct argument for his mechanical model of nature.  Instead, his presentation is hypothetical, and he uses a fable that details God’s creation of the world and through which he hopes the truth of his claims will be revealed.  The standard for what is admissible in his creation story is human intelligibility, a standard that he claims distinguishes his account from the unintelligible Scholastic account of nature.  He writes (slide), 
my purpose, unlike theirs, is not to explain the things that are in fact in the actual world, but only to make up as I please a world in which there is nothing that the dullest minds cannot conceive, and which nevertheless could not be created exactly the way I have imagined it (AT X, 36; Descartes 1998, 24).   
While Descartes admits that basing his account on the standard of human intelligibility forces him to relinquish the absolute truth of his fable, it nonetheless places the creation story on firm ground as a possible way in which God created the world and grants it more plausibility than the less intelligible world of the Scholastics.  
The hypothetical account of creation Descartes offers in Chapters 6 and 7 of Treatise on Light runs as follows (slide):	
1. God chooses an area of infinite space and creates matter in it (Chapter 6).
2. Upon creating matter, God also imposes motion on each part.  Specifically, God endows each part of matter a particular direction and a particular speed (Chapter 6).
3. The speed and direction granted to the parts of matter results in the formation of material objects as we experience them (Chapter 6).
4. Since God is immutable, He conserves the motion of matter in the same way He created it (Chapter 7).
5. There are rules (or laws) of motion which govern material bodies and which ultimately rest on God’s immutability and unchanging conservation of natural motions (Chapter 7).
The central role that Descartes grants matter and motion in this new world is apparent.  The world begins as formless matter and takes on the forms we see in nature due to God granting each part of matter a particular motion.  The motion that Descartes appeals to, however, is not the obscure motion of the Scholastics but is modeled instead on the motions embraced by the geometers.  He writes (slide):  
the nature of the motion that I mean to speak of here is so easily known that even geometers, who among all men are the most concerned to conceive the things they study very distinctly, have judged it simpler and more intelligible than the nature of surfaces and lines, as is shown by the fact that they explain ‘line’ as the motion of a point and ‘surface’ as the motion of a line (AT X, 39; Descartes 1998, 26).  
Though Descartes is putting his own interpretive gloss on the role of motion in geometry, his account of geometrically intelligible motions in Le Monde fits well with his claim in the Geometry that properly geometrical curves are to be generated by continuous motions.  The neatness of fit is made even clearer when he says (slide):  “I know of no motion…which is easier to conceive of than the lines of the geometers, by which bodies pass from one place to another and successively occupy all the spaces in between” (AT X, 40; Descartes 1998, 27).  The visible motions of his new world are modeled on the continuous motions used by geometers to generate curves; and thus, we see Descartes integrating his approach to geometry with his early attempt at formulating a general, mechanical account of nature.  
But there’s a further (and I think more important) connection that can be made between his math and metaphysics when we consider the third of the three rules that govern the continuous motions in his new world (slide):  
[Rule 3:  W]hen a body is moving, even if its motion most often takes place along a curved line…, nevertheless each of its parts individually tends always to continue moving along a straight line.  And so the action of these parts, that is the inclination they have to move, is different from their motion (AT X, 43-44; Descartes 1998, 29).
To get a better handle on what Descartes is proposing in Rule 3, consider his example of the motion of a ball in a sling (Figure; slide).  We observe the ball moving along an arc from L to F, but if we consider the ball’s motion at an instant, we find that it has a centrifugal tendency in a straight line.  For instance, when the ball is between points V and A (slide), the ball would continue along the path to E if it were not constrained by the sling, and when between points V and B, it would continue along the rectilinear path to Y, and so on. What this example reveals is that the continuous motions we witness in nature can be reduced to motions at an instant.  In other words, apparently continuous motions are fundamentally discontinuous, and as Descartes clarifies, it is God who directs the path of a body’s motion at every instant (slide): 
FIGURE:  Sling in Rule 3 (Descartes 1998, 31)


This rule rests on the same foundation as the other two, and depends solely on God’s conserving everything by a continuous action, and consequently on His conserving it not as it may have been some time earlier but precisely as it is at the very instant He conserves it.  So, of all motions, only motion in a straight line is entirely simple and has a nature which may be grasped wholly in an instant.  For in order to conceive of such motion it is enough to think that a body is in the process of motion in a certain direction, and that this is the case at each determinable instant during the time it is moving.  (AT X, 44-45; Descartes 1998, 29-30).
You’ll notice that the tendency of a body at each instant must be in a straight line, because these are the only motions which we can humanly conceive at an instant.  In general, God imposes direction and speed onto every part of matter; but at any given instant, all we can conceive is the direction of God’s push, so to speak, and again, due to the limits of what we can humanly conceive, this direction must be in a straight line.  
	I want to suggest that here, in the domain of metaphysics – where Descartes appeals to human intelligibility as his standard for describing God’s creation of the world – we find a justification for the contentious equivalence that Descartes presented in the Geometry.  You’ll recall that in order to maintain the status of Pappus curves as geometrically intelligible, he had to assume that curves generated by generic point-wise constructions were also constructible by continuous motions.  In the context of the Geometry, there is no mathematical argument presented to support the equivalency, but looking at what Descartes presents in Le Monde, we find that curves generated by continuous motions are in fact reducible to instantaneous motions, or more precisely, to the infinite points of motion along the curve.  In the case of the ball in the sling (slide), it traces a continuous path along the curve from L to F, i.e., there is no break in its visible motion.  But as Descartes points out, its continuous motion can be understood as an infinite series of pushes, where in this metaphysical context, it is God who imposes the instantaneous straight line pushes, which ultimately explain the body’s motion.  [The circular path of the motion is explained by Descartes in reference to the disposition of matter through which the ball moves.]
	Though neither God’s activity nor any other metaphysical claim plays an explicit role in Descartes’ program of geometry, I want to suggest that this metaphysical account of continuous motions in nature presented in Rule 3 provided Descartes a model for understanding the equivalency of generic point-wise constructions and constructions by continuous motion.  For since in both the domain of metaphysics and the domain of mathematics the standard of admissibility is the same – namely, human intelligibility renders curves and motions acceptable – to say that God’s point-wise construction of continuous curves in nature is acceptable in metaphysics is to say at the same time that any such point-wise construction could serve as the explanation for the generation of continuous curves, which is precisely the controversial claim that Descartes makes in the domain of geometry.  There is of course an important disanalogy between the two cases insofar as mathematical points are not attributed tendencies or forces.  But if we consider the geometrical case as an idealization of the motions of bodies, then the absence of a force or a tendency in a particular direction does not render the reduction of continuous motion to motions at an instant any less acceptable in the domain of geometry, where we can generate continuous curves by appeal to point-wise constructions.   
	So while the equivalency of generic point-wise constructions to constructions by continuous motions is presented in the Geometry without an explicit argument, my suggestion is that it is not, as Grosholz suggests, merely presented as an ad hoc assumption that will allow Descartes to maintain his intuitionist-reductionist program.  With the standard of human intelligibility as the common thread running through the metaphysics of Le Monde and the mathematical program of the Geometry, Descartes could (at least implicitly) rely on the intelligibility of God’s creation of natural motions to sustain the intelligibility of generic point-wise constructions in mathematics and thus its acceptability in his program of geometry.  Without a general method for tracing all Pappus curves at his disposal, this it seems is actually the best that Descartes could do with the resources available to him.


IV. The Changing Character of Cartesian Math and Metaphysics After 1637
If I’m right about drawing this connection between Descartes’ early math and early metaphysics, we gain important insight into the changes he makes to his conception of mathematics in his later, more mature works.  For you’ll notice that on the reading of the 1633 to 1637 period I’ve presented, Descartes is trying to connect his hypothetical account of how God may have created the world with his non-hypothetical account of geometry and geometrical construction.  In the domain of mathematics, the standard of human intelligibility renders curves necessarily ‘geometric’ or ‘imaginary’, whereas in the domain of metaphysics, human intelligibility renders his account of God’s creation possible but not necessary.  For as Descartes makes clear, both in Le Monde and in the 1637 Discourse on Method, human intelligibility cannot limit what God actually did when He created the world.  Therefore, if we want to maintain God’s omnipotence (as Descartes surely does) and are also to have a mathematical system adequate to the task of understanding the variety of bodies and motions that God has created, it seems we need to have a more liberal account of what is mathematically intelligible.  
And if we look at Descartes’ post-1637 writings, there is I think a noticeable progression away from the more restrictive account of mathematical intelligibility in the Geometry and toward a more liberal account of mathematics.  For instance, in the Meditations, we find that the certainty of mathematical knowledge no longer rests on our ability to conceive of how mathematical objects are constructed; rather, Descartes focuses on our clear and distinct awareness of their essential properties, or what, loosely speaking, we can call their definitions.  Thus, when he speaks of our idea of a triangle in Meditation Five, he reports that its form, or nature, or essence is given to the mind and revealed to us when we attend to the innate ideas of mathematical objects that have been placed in us by God at the moment of our creation.
Beyond the textual evidence from his mature writings, Descartes indicates in his correspondence to Mersenne that he’s adopting a new perspective on mathematics and that his change of heart stems from his interest in developing a mathematics appropriate to the study of nature.   Descartes writes in 1638 (one year after the Geometry’s publication) (slide):
…I have decided to give up only abstract geometry, that is to say, the investigation of problems which function merely as mental exercises.  My aim is to have more time to devote to another sort of geometry where the problems have to do with the explanation of natural phenomena (Letter to Mersenne, 27 July 1638; AT II, 268; CSMK 118-119).
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